Yunnan Agreement 1957

The Chinese wanted the bomb and actively participated in research at the new Soviet Joint Institute for Nuclear Studies in Dubna, outside Moscow, founded in 1955. From 1955 to 1958, the Soviets and Chinese signed six agreements to promote China`s nuclear science, industry and weapons program. They have worked on uranium mining and production, the development of physics, the training of Chinese students in nuclear physics in the Soviet Union, the use of nuclear energy and the construction of a heavy water research reactor, a cyclotron and a particle accelerator in China. [12] Cooperation should include the transfer of the bomb itself to China. Supreme Soviet President Kliment Wooshilov visited China in April 1957, and on October 15, 1957, the two sides agreed on the new technical defense agreement. Marshal Nie Rongzhen and his deputies Chen Geng and Song Renqiong travelled to Moscow to clarify the terms of the exchange. [13] The Soviets were to supply the Chinese with a prototype atomic bomb, missiles and related defense technologies. [14] A military delegation, led by Defence Minister Peng Dehuai, stayed in Moscow for a month after the Socialist Party Conference in November 1957. Both sides have worked to coordinate and standardize weapons production and communication systems and to promote the exchange of education and training. [15] Tahun 1957 mesin ketik sudah ada make Times new novel dan tabulasi yang sempurna.

LOL The general problems and tensions that characterize the alliance are highlighted in these documents on Sinosovotic defence cooperation. Qian Xuesen, head of the Chinese delegation, was a leader in Chinese missile development research, earning a Ph.D. in physics from the California Institute of Technology and working at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California. [17] Such a context clearly allowed him to ask comparative questions about the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet programmes. This was an eternally delicate issue that manifested itself in the routine questions of the Chinese to Soviet advisers in many areas of the exchange. [18] In particular, “old Chinese technicians” have often questioned the authority of Soviet experts in China. [19] Money and exchange financing were another sensitive issue that has been contested since the signing of the Friendship Treaty and mutual alliance in Moscow in February 1950. [20] The importance and necessity of Chinese autonomy has become increasingly important to many senior officials with the development of the relationship, but on many practical issues, the Chinese simply preferred to import finished products and ready-to-use technology.

Zhou Enlai acknowledged this in a meeting with East German, Polish and Czechoslovakian officials in February 1955 and said that Comparative poverty and China`s lack of development justified such a strategy. [21] In discussions here, Wang Yi of the PLA Staff bluntly informs the Soviets that the “best alternative” would be for the Soviets to simply provide a steering missile capable of supplying an atomic bomb. The Soviets had developed an intercontinental missile capable of carrying an atomic bomb (the R-7) which they successfully tested in May 1957. [22] In January 1958, they delivered two R-2 missiles (a related model) to China. [23] Dokumen ini, jikapun benar ada dan bukan tipuan, terdiri dari delapan halaman, ditandatangani pada tahun 1957, ditandatangani oleh Mr.